WhatsApp And Facebook Signals Can Be Used To Get Your Location
Hackers can monitor 4G mobile networks to detect users' location using supposedly anonymised identifiers
Security researchers have revealed how simply contacting somebody via WhatsApp or Facebook messenger can reveal a smartphone owner's location by exploiting a security flaw in 4G mobile networks.
A hacker could use the apps to discover the supposedly anonymised identifiers that are assigned to devices when they connect to a network, and use them to locate their owner, according to researchers in Finland and Germany.
When a smartphone connects to a mobile network, it is assigned a temporary number called a TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity). The network then uses this eight-digit number to identify a device, rather than a phone number, to make communication more private.
However, a hacker monitoring radio communications could tie this TMSI to an individual by sending them a Facebook message or WhatsApp chat, both of which trigger a special "paging request" from a network that contains specific location information about a particular TMSI number.
Anybody with a Facebook account can send another user a Facebook message. Unless the two users are friends, this message will end up in Facebook's "Other" folder, a feature most users do not know about that is only accessible on the social network's desktop version, but sending a user a message will still trigger a paging request.
Likewise, WhatsApp's "typing notification" - a feature on the chat app that displays when a contact is composing a message - also triggers the connection. If a hacker has a victim's phone number, they could send them a message on WhatsApp, and if the victim begins to type a response, the network issues a paging request.
Within these paging requests are location data, that on newer 4G networks can be used to track users' locations to an area of 2km2.
Older 2G and 3G networks would place a particular smartphone within a given "tracking area" of around 100km2, representing less of a security issue, but modern 4G networks place them in smaller "cells" of around 2km2, making it much easier to pinpoint a smartphone.
It is relatively easy to monitor these signals using easily-available network hardware, according to the researchers from Aalto University, the University of Helsinki, Technische Universitat Berlin and Telekom Innovation Laboratories.
Although TMSIs are supposed to refresh relatively often, in order to protect privacy, they can persist for up to three days, the researchers said.
More aggressive attackers can set up a fake network base station to accurately triangulate users. These stations can request reports from TMSI numbers, typically used in cases of network failure, which can accurately reveal a smartphone's location. At least one device gave away its GPS co-ordinates after a failure request, the researchers said.